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Evidence on the Lack of Separation
Between Business and Personal Risks
Among Small Businesses
James S. Ang
James Wuh Lin
Floyd Tyler

Small business researchers conjecture that there is little separation between
business and personal risks among small businesses. Personal assets and
wealth can be subject to business risks in the form of an implicit or explicit
claim depending on the organizational form and whether personal
commitments are pledged by owners. The choice of organizational form can
be considered a mechanism to increase the degree of separation; however,
lenders' requirements for personal commitments mitigate the benefits of
limited liability provisions. This paper examines the role of personal
collateral and personal guarantees in augmenting implicit claims on business
and personal assets with explicit claims on personal assets and personal
wealth. We document the degree of non-separation of business and personal
risks for 692 firms. Our results suggests that small business owners have a
significant incidence of personal assets and wealth pledged for business loans,
even for organizational forms such as S-corporations and C-corporations
with hmited legal liability. These results confirm the conjecture that there is a
lack of separation between business and personal risks. The lack of separation
of business and personal risks has important policy implications for the
borrowing patterns and access to credit markets of small businesses.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Small business researchers conjecture that there is little separation of the
business and personal risks associated with small business ownership.
Personal assets can be subject to business risks in the form of an implicit
or explicit claim on personal assets depending on the organizational
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form and whether a personal commitment has been pledged. For
example, if a financial institution grants an unsecured loan to a business,
the financial institution has an implicit claim on all assets of the business.
By pledging business collateral to obtain the loan, the business owner
augments the implicit claim on all business assets with an explicit claim
on a business asset. Similarly, pledging personal assets as collateral
(personal guarantees) commits the specific assets (personal wealth) of
the owner. This paper examines the extent small business owners use
personal collateral and personal guarantees to augment implicit claims
on business and/or personal assets with explicit claims on personal assets
and personal wealth. It empirically investigates the degree of non
separation of business and personal risks.
Personal collateral and personal guarantees have similar implications
for the nature of bank claims. They are a means to enhance credit via
other collateralization. Since there is a difference in the stated legal
liability for organizational forms, the incidence of personal commitments
(i.e., personal collateral and/or personal guarantees) is examined for each
organizational form. Sole proprietorships and partnerships have
unlimited business and personal liability. In the absence of personal
commitments, owners are subject to an implicit claim on all business
assets and personal wealth. Under non-corporate organizational forms,
the pledging of personal collateral augments the implicit claim on all
personal wealth with an explicit claim on a personal asset. Although it
does not reduce the size of the implicit claim on personal wealth,
pledging personal collateral adds an explicit claim on a personal asset.
The pledging of a personal guarantee augments the implicit claim on all
personal assets and wealth with an explicit claim on all personal wealth
including future income. Personal collateral requirements for non
corporate organizational forms may appear redundant; however, the
pledging of personal assets may provide the lender with greater ability to
prevent asset disposition or a reduction in asset values.
Under corporate organizational forms, the pledging of personal
commitments generates explicit claims on personal assets and/or wealth.
The pledging of personal collateral reduces the effectiveness of limited
liability protection under corporate organizational forms. Personal assets
are no longer separated from business assets and lenders’ claims fall
explicitly on the owners, thus allowing lenders to pierce the corporate veil.
The analysis of the lack of separation between business and personzil
risks is a unique contribution for several reasons.
1.
This analysis allows small business researchers to complete their
understanding of the total risks faced by owners of small businesses.
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These risks of small business ownership may extend beyond business
failure and could result in personal ruin. Thus, theoretical models of
corporate finance theory need to accommodate a more complicated
limited liability condition.
2. It proposes a partial explanation of credit rationing by lenders.
Bernanke and Lown (1992) argue that the decline in bank lending in the
early 1990s (i.e., credit crunch of 1990s) may have been related to a
deterioration in the quality of business collateral offered by firms seeking
bank credit or an increase in the amount or quality of business collateral
demanded by banks. Our result extends this explanation confirming that
in the absence of available business collateral, a substantial proportion of
small business owners are required to pledge personal commitments to
obtain business loans. Personal commitments by lenders can be personal
collateral and/or personal guarantees. A personal guarantee differs from
personal collateral in that a personal guarantee provides an explicit
claim on the personal wealth of the owner, rather than an explicit claim
on a personal asset. A lender’s ability to seek repayment from an owner
is not limited to personal assets, but also includes the current wealth and
future income of the owner. Our extension of Bernanke and Lown may
help explain why some business owners, who lack the personal assets and
wealth to provide personal commitments, are more likely to experience
business credit rationing. Thus, models of loan markets should
incorporate the equilibrium supply of personal commitments.
3. It may help explain the relationship between personal
commitments and firm characteristics such as profitability and leverage.
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the lack of
separation between business and personal risks among small businesses,
which may have important theoretical and policy implications on models
of corporate finance and the audit market.
II.

SCOPE

The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical support for the widely
accepted conjecture that there is a lack of separation between business
and personal risks among small businesses. We examine the extent
personal real estate, other personal assets, and personal guarantees
pledged for business loans, while increasing the amount of assets
financed and the firm’s leverage ratio. The pledging of personal
commitments increases the personal risks of business ownership. Higher
personal commitment requirements subject small business owners to the
risks of simultaneous business and personal bankruptcies. This paper

200

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE

4(2/3) 1995

documents the personal risks among small businesses for different
organizational forms.
Organizational form may affect the willingness or ability of business
owners to make personal commitments, in addition to other factors such
as tax planning, resolution of agency problems, etc. The choice of
organizational form such as corporations can be considered a mechanism
to increase the degree of separation between business and personal risks.
Sole proprietorships and partnerships do not have legal protection from
unlimited liability in the case of business failure. These organizational
forms are normally expected to experience a lower degree of separation
between business and personal risks than corporations. On the other
hand, pledging personal collateral weakens the limited liability
protection of the corporate form, thus increasing the personal risks of
the business ownership. Personal guarantees further weaken the limited
liability protection of corporate organizational forms since a personal
guarantee pledges current wealth and future incomes to obtain a business
loan.
Prior literature examined several factors related to the incidence of
business collateral which may also be related to the incidence of personal
commitments within organizational forms. Firm size, debt ratio, and firm
profitability were used to investigate the relation between firm
characteristics and personal commitments. The significance of each
factor was examined for each organizational form to allow for more
insightful analyses.
We also examine an agency explanation for the incidence of personal
commitments across organizational forms. Partnerships are predicted to
have a lower incidence of personal commitments by individual partners
than the other organizational forms due to the higher potential agency
problems betvveen partners. The actions of an individual partner can
place the personal assets and wealth of all other partners at risks. This
potential agency problem leads to greater personal risks in the
partnership form. Due to unequal risk sharing and firee-riding among
partners, each of the partners will be less inclined to pledge personal
collateral or personal guarantees for business loans. Partners will want to
reserve the option to mitigate the agency-related actions of other
partners by retaining the right to withhold personal assets from the
partnership via asset disposal or assignment. The pledging of personal
assets on behalf of the partnership would eliminate this means of
protection from other partners. Our paper is organized as follows.
Section III outlines the relevant literature. Section IV discusses the
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NSSBF data and our methodology. Section V presents the results.
Section VI concludes.

III. LITERATURE
Many small businesses pledge business collateral for debt financing.
Berger and Udell (1990) report that two-thirds of all commercial bank
loans are extended on a secured basis. The National Federation of
Independent Businesses (NFIB) reports that 60 percent of firms with
commercial bank loans pledge business collateral as security for the loan
agreement. The NFIB also reports that some form of collateral is
pledged for 80 percent o f the dollar volume of small business loans.
Evidence suggests that several factors affect business collateralization.
Leeth and Scott (1989) find seven factors influencing the use of business
collateral: probability of default, firm size, asset specialization, loan
maturity, loan size, real risk-free interest rate, and the legal environment.
They find that the incidence of debt secured by business collateral
among small businesses is direcdy related to their probability of default
and inversely related to the loan size, loan maturity, and the
marketability of assets.
Several theories have attempted to explain the use of business
collateral among larger firms (see Scott, 1977; Smith & Warner, 1979;
Stulz & Johnson, 1985, on limited liability theory). Chan and Kanatas
(1985) suggest a theory that predicts collateral usage based on loan size,
loan maturity, «md company size. Leeth and Scott (1989) proposes an
agency explanation that the business collateral provision lowers a firm’s
total cost of debt in three ways: 1) reduces incentives for asset
substitution by managers; 2) reduces potential foreclosure costs; and 3)
mitigates the underinvestment problem.
Business collateral usage varies across firm and owner characteristics.
Firm size is inversely related to collateral usage. Altman, Haldeman, and
Narayanan (1977) suggest that collateral may reduce debt expenses more
for smaller firms because of their higher probability of bankmptcy. None
of these studies examines personal collateral or personal guarantees
pledged for business loans. A more detailed analysis of personal
commitments can provide additional insight into small business lending.
The existing literature on small business collateral has left personal
collateral usage largely unexplored. Our paper differs from the existing
business collateral literature in several ways. First, we document the
incidence of personal commitments by small business owners to
investigate the lack of separation of business and personal risks. Previous
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measures of business risks in earlier studies have excluded the usage of
personal collateral and personal guarantees, thus underestimating its
true magnitude. Second, we examine whether some of the factors that
are related to business collateral are also related to personal
commitments.
Third, we examine an agency explanation of the incidence of
personal risks across organizational forms. The agency explanation
predicts that partnerships will have a lower incidence of personal
commitments than other organizational forms due to higher potential
agency problems between partners. First, partners have an unlimited
personal liability for business risks including the activities of the other
partners. In a partnership, business partners have a greater ability to
dispose, pledge for personal use, or sell personal assets. If the personal
assets remain unencumbered, partners can escape the onus of unlimited
liability. Pledging these assets for business loans would remove ownership
rights from the asset’s owners. Another problem involves the unequal risk
exposure and free-riding related to which partner should pledge
personal assets among business partners. The pledging of personal
commitments by one partner could lead to adverse incentives for other
partners to take greater business risks at the expense of the partner(s)
pledging personal assets. Thus, the participation in a partnership results
in implicit claims on the business assets and the personal assets and
wealth of all partners. By pledging personal collateral, partners augment
the general claim on personal assets and wealth with a specific claim on
personal assets. Likewise, partners who pledge a personal guarantee
augment the general claim on all partners’ personal assets and wealth
with a specific claim on his or her personal wealth.
Sole proprietorships are not subject to the agency problems
associated with the partnership form. Pledging of personal
commitments is related to the risk perception and aversion of the
lender and the owner’s perception of the business opportunity. The
pledging of personal assets by sole proprietorship may appear
redundant, except where there is a need to make the lender’s claim on
personal wealth explicit. However, the personal commitment is a
means of credit enhancement to the lender in some cases. We also
provide evidence on the extent personal collateral and guarantees are
committed by small business corporations whose owners are protected
from business losses. Using the NSSBF data, we are able to examine
this explanation in a meaningful way. Our paper fills these important
gaps in the literature.
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METHOD

One reason for the paucity of empirical work on personal risks of
business ownership is the lack of available data on personal commitments
for business loans. Recently, a source of data has been collected which
contains information on personal commitments pledged for business
loans. The data is obtained from the National Survey of Small Business
Finances conducted by the Research Triangle Institute jointly sponsored
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Small
Business Administration. The survey was conducted from October 1988
March 1989. The survey focuses on non-financial, non-agriculture small
businesses (less than 500 employees) that were operating as of December,
1987. Firms involved in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry;
finance and insurance underwriting; or real estate investment trusts were
excluded from the survey. Financial data was collected only for the last
fiscal year. The survey consists of 3,404 firms— 1,875 corporations, 1,529
partnerships and sole proprietorships. The survey contains several
measures of business collateral and personal commitments.
The business collateral pledged are inventory and accounts
receivable, equipment, and business real estate. Personal real estate,
other personal assets, and personal guarantees are the three observed
forms of personzJ commitments. The sample contains 692 firms with
usable responses, regarding the relevant items of interest. It is note
worthy that the data on personal commitments are reported as
dichotomous variables, which are recorded as personal commitments
pledged if any of the three measures of personal commitments are
pledged. The organizational form breakdown for the usable sample is as
follows: 118 sole proprietorships, 51 partnerships, 121 5-corporations
and 402 C-corporations.
To conduct our analyses, we examine the incidence of personal
commitments by organizational form and one of the following variables:
firm size, profitability, and leverage ratio. The sample partitioning allows
us to examine the incidence of personal commitments within
organizational forms.
V.

RESULTS

Panel A of Table 1 depicts the relation between the incidence of personal
commitments and organizational forms. Sixty-nine percent of the firms
(478/692) pledged some form of personal commitment for a business
loan. To fixrther investigate these results, the sample is partitioned by
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organizational form. Sole proprietorships and partnerships have similar
incidences of personal commitments, 54.6 percent and 54.1 percent
respectively. This result is consistent with the lack of separation of
business and personal risks. 5-corporations have the highest incidence of
personal commitments pledged at 72.9 percent, while 58.9 percent of Ccorporations pledge some form of personal commitment. The lower level
of personal commitments for partnerships relative to corporations is
consistent with our agency explanation. The higher proportion of
personal commitment for corporations is evidence of a weakening of
limited liability provisions for small businesses, which suggests that not
all corporations can claim protection from the limited liability provision.
Panel B reports the incidence of each form of personal commitment
for different organizational forms. Personal guarantees are the most
Table 1
Incidence of Personal Commitments Pledged for Business Loans and Small
Business Organizational Forms
Panel A
Personal
Collateral

Business Loans with
personal commitment
Business Loans w/o
personal commitment
Sample Size
Notes:

Sole
Proprietorships

Partnerships

S-Corporations

C-Corporations

54.6%
(74)
45.4%
(44)
100%
(118)

54.1%
(34)
45.9%
(17)
100%
(51)

72.9%
(98)
27.1%
(23)
100%
(121)

58.9%
(272)
41.1%
(130)
100%
(402)

The personal commitment variables are personal real estate, other personal assets, and
personal guarantees.

Table 1
Breakdown of Personal Commitments for Business Loans
Panel B

Personal real estate
Other personal assets
Personal guarantee
Notes:

Sole
proprietorships

Partnerships

S-corporations

C-corporations

81.4%
(35/43)
16.3%
(15/92)
83%
(39/47)

75%
(3/4)
10.8%
(4/37)
97%
(32/33)

100%
(15/15)
18.8%
(18/85)
100%
(81/81)

82.9%
(34/41)
14.2%
(44/309)
97.1%
(235/242)

The number of firms used to calculate the percentages are reported in parentheses. The
numerator is the number of firms which pledged some form of personal commitment. The
denominator is the total number of firms in each cell with usable, non-missing responses.
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common form of personal commitment for all organizational forms,
followed by personal real estate. The larger number of firms pledging
personal real estate than ‘other personal assets’ may be explained by
lenders’ preferences for real estate as personal collateral. If a loan default
occurs, lenders are more likely to take possession of personal real estate
than many other personal assets which could be dissipated or hidden
more quickly. The general lack of liquidity of personal real estate makes
it easier to monitor compared to other personal assets such as furniture
or jewelry.
Partnerships have a lower incidence of personal real estate and other
personal assets than the other organizational forms, except for personal
guarantees. These results are consistent with our agency explanation.
Individual partners are less likely to pledge personal commitments to
secure business loans.
Large difierences in personal commitments between organizational
forms are mosdy limited to the personal real estate category among
corporations. The difference between the corporate forms may have an
agency explanation. One could argue that 5-corporations are more
likely to have a smaller number of shareholders consisting of family and
friends, while C-corporations may have larger numbers of shareholders
who are linked by business ties only. The nature of these ties may infer
that owners, who are family members, may be more likely to pledge
personal commitments. Overall, these results support our claim that
limited liability protection is severely reduced for corporations. This
evidence strongly suggests that personal risks of small business ownership
extend beyond business risks and the risks of losing specific personal
assets to the current and future wealth of small business owners.
Table 2 shows the relation between firm size and the incidence of
personal commitments for different organizational forms. The sample is
partitioned into the following size categories based upon total assets: less
than $100,000, $100,000-$500,000, and $500,000 or greater. With the
exception o f partnerships, the demand for personal commitments by
lenders decreases as firm size increases. There is nearly a 20 percentage
point difference in the incidence of personal commitments between the
smallest and largest size categories of sole proprietorships. The inverse
relation between the incidence of personal commitments and firm size
confirms results found in previous studies of business collateral and firm
size.
These results for firm size could be consistent with several
explanations.
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Table 2

Incidence of Personal Commitments Pledged for
Business Loans and Firm Size
Firm Size
(Asset Size)

Smallest
(< $100,000)
Medium
($100,000-500,000)
Largest
(> $500,000)
Notes:

Sole
Proprietorships

Partnerships

S-Corporations

C-Corporations

69.6%
(39/56)
58.3%
(28/48)
50%
(7/14)

56.3%
(9/16)
62.5%
(10/16)
78.9%
(15/19)

100%
(11/11)
80.6%
(29/36)
78.4%
(58/74)

82.8%
(24/29)
67.2%
(80/119)
66.1%
(168/254)

The percentages reflect the incidence of personal commitments for each cell. The
numerator is the number of firms in each cell which pledged some form of personal
commitment. The denominator is the total number of firms in each cell with usable, non
missing responses.

1. It may be increasingly difficult for some owners to willingly
pledge personal assets as the number of investors increases.
2. Size could be a reflection of prior success and thus, there may be
lower requirements for personal commitments by lenders to obtain a
business loan.
3. The type of small business may be related to size. Manufacturing
and mining firms are larger and have more tangible assets, while service
firms are smaller and have fewer fixed assets available for collateral.
4. Larger firms may have more fixed business assets which can be
pledged as business collateral, while smaller firms may have less business
collateral. Lenders would require similar levels of personal commitments
from smaller businesses. The significant difference in the incidence of
personal commitments based upon firm size provides evidence of the
lack of separation of total risks that is most acute in the smallest of small
businesses. Large non-financial firms tend to be corporations and are
assumed to possess a greater degree of separation of business and
personal risks. Yet, a non-negligible amount of personal risks still exists
among small business corporations, thus reducing the benefits of limited
liability protection. Thus, many small business owners are either required
to or voluntarily pledge personal assets and wealth to supplement
business collateral in order to obtain credit financing.
Table 3 depicts the relation betiveen leverage ratio and the incidence
of personal commitments for different organizational forms. Leverage
ratio is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. The sample is
partitioned based upon three leverage categories: less than 15 percent,
15-40 percent, and greater than 40 percent. Firms with lower leverage
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Table 3
Incidence of Personal Commitments Pledged for Business Loans and
Leverage
Leverage

Sole
Proprietorships

Partnerships

S-Corporations

C-Corporations

Low
(LR < 15%)
Medium
(15 % < LR < 40%)
High
(LR > 40%)

50%
(9/18)
67.9%
(19/28)
64.7%
(44/68)

75%
(3/4)
100%
(6/6)
57.9%
(22/38)

80%
(4/5)
72.2%
(13/18)
83.3%
(75/90)

50%
(5/10)
76.3%
(45/59)
68.1%
(213/313)

Notes:

The number of firms used to calculate the percentages are reported in parentheses. The
numerator is the number of firms in each cell which pledge some form of personal
commitment. The denominator is the total number of firms in each cell with usable, non
missing responses.

Table 4
Incidence of Personal Commitments Pledged for Business Loans and
Profitability
Profitability

Profitable
Unprofitable
Notes:

Sole
Proprietorships

Partnerships

S-Corporations

C-Corporations

63.3%
(50/79)
65%
(13/20)

63.2%
(24/38)
80%
(4/5)

76.6%
(59/77)
89.2%
(33/37)

67.2%
(178/265)
69.1%
(67/97)

The number of firms used to calculate the percentages are reported in parentheses. The
numerator is the number of firms which provided some form of personal commitment. The
denominator is the total number of firms with usable, non-missing responses.

ratios have lower incidences of personal commitments, except for
partnerships. One explanation is that leverage is constrained by the
ability or willingness of owners to make personal commitments. Smaller
businesses do not have the supply of unencumbered personal assets or
sufficient personal wealth to secure higher levels of leverage. Owners of
proprietorships (corporations) with smaller (larger) personal assets may
also have fewer (more) other sources of funds and thus desiring more
credit financing.
Table 4 reports the relation between profitability and the incidence
of personal commitments for different organizational forms. The sample
is partitioned into two profitability categories; non-negative profits and
negative profits. Profits are measured as earnings before taxes. Sole
proprietorships and C-corporations reflect little disparit)^ in the
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differences in personal commitments, while partnerships and Scorporations have greater disparity. There is an inverse relationship
between profitability and personal commitments. The results for
partnerships and corporations suggest that: 1) profitable firms are able
to refuse a lender’s demand for more personal commitments when the
firm is doing well or can use internal funds generated from profitability
to obtain financing or 2) owners of unprofitable firms, who possess
favorable asymmetric information or are more optimistic, are willing to
pledge personal assets or wealth. Thus, increasing the simultaneous
occurrence of business ruin and personal ruin when the firms are not
doing well. Our results find evidence that the total risk of small business
ownership is greater than previously presumed for noncorporate as well
as corporate organizational forms.
VI.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The results suggests that personal commitments are an important
component of small business lending. The incidence of personal
commitments is related to organizational form, firm size, profitability,
and leverage ratios. Firm size is inversely related to the incidence of
personal commitments for sole proprietorships and corporations. Larger
firms have a greater degree of separation of business and personal risks
and thus lower personal commitments. The results for profitability and
leverage are consistent with this explanation. We find empirical support
for an agency explanation of personal commitments among
organizational forms. Partnerships have the lowest incidence of personal
commitments among organizational forms. In sum, we find empirical
evidence supporting the conjecture that there is a lack of separation of
business and personal risks among most small businesses.
Small businesses depend primarily on banks for debt financing.
Popast (1986) finds that the small firms’ bank financing accounts for 2030 percent of their total debt and a larger proportion of secured debt.
Personal collateralization may allow financial institutions to finance
more riskier projects on the margin than they would in its absence.
Given this dependence on credit financing, corporations are faced with a
difficult dilemma with respect to minimizing the personal risks of
business ownership and obtaining credit financing. Owners of
corporations are required to pledge personal commitments, which
forfeits the limited liability protection of their organization structure.
Prior to this paper, there was no empirical evidence of the personal risks
of small business ownership. The personal risks are substantial for all
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organizational forms and should be included when examining business
risks.
There are important poliq: implications for the finding of a lack of
separation of personal and business risks in small businesses.
1. An underinvestment problem could exists if risk averse small
business owners become less willing to borrow funds to be
supported by personal assets and wealth to undertake positive net
present value projects. Economic development and growth in
smaller communities where owners may have undiversified
personal portfolios may be restrained since these projects must be
forgone. A high incidence of lenders requiring personal collateral
and guarantees may severely reduce personal diversification of
small business owners.
2. It may help explain differences in the availability of credit
financing among seemingly similar small businesses. TTie fact that
some owners are more willing and/or able to pledge personal
collateral and personal guarantees implies that business owners
without the ability to provide them may be rationed credit by
financial institutions. Institutions are requiring small business
owners to pledge personal assets and wealth. Thus, in modeling
the loan function of small businesses, personal commitments
must be included.
3. The availability of personal commitments could enable small
businesses to obtain debt financing even in the presence of
asymmetric information between owners and lenders. Thus, one
could argue that the ability and willingness of owners to pledge
personal commitments as a signal can circumvent the effects of
asymmetric information in credit markets.
4. Our findings also have important implications for finance theory
including capital structure, agency costs, and risk aversion/
bankmptcy. Leverage levels for small businesses are overstated
since the relevant total asset base should include business and
personal assets. Theories of leverage should encompass personal
risks to accurately reflect the total risks of leverage for small
business. Empirical attempts to explain small business leverage
are mis-specified if personal risks are not incorporated. Agencyrelated issues such as asset substitution and claim dilution must
be expanded to incorporate personal assets. The threat of
bankruptcy becomes more ominous since not only the business
assets are vulnerable, but so are personal assets.
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